JezK

Edit File: FUTURE.pol

# A level that will provide security on a conservative level that is # believed to withstand any near-term future attacks. And also provide # some (not complete) preparation for post quantum encryption support # in form of 256 bit symmetric encryption requirement. # It provides at least an 128-bit security. This level may prevent # communication with many used systems that provide weaker security levels # (e.g., systems that use SHA-1 as signature algorithm). # MACs: all HMAC with SHA256 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc) # Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) # Signature algorithms: with SHA-256 hash or better (no DSA) # TLS Ciphers: >= 256-bit key, >= 128-bit block, only Authenticated Encryption (AE) ciphers, no CBC ciphers # non-TLS Ciphers: same as TLS Ciphers with added non AE ciphers, CBC only for Kerberos # key exchange: ECDHE, DHE (no DHE-DSS) # DH params size: >= 3072 # RSA params size: >= 3072 # TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2, DTLS >= 1.2 mac = AEAD HMAC-SHA2-256 UMAC-128 HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-512 mac@Kerberos = HMAC-SHA2-384 HMAC-SHA2-256 AEAD UMAC-128 HMAC-SHA2-512 group = X25519 SECP256R1 X448 SECP521R1 SECP384R1 \ FFDHE-3072 FFDHE-4096 FFDHE-6144 FFDHE-8192 hash = SHA2-256 SHA2-384 SHA2-512 SHA3-256 SHA3-384 SHA3-512 SHAKE-256 hash@RPM = SHA1+ sign = ECDSA-SHA3-256 ECDSA-SHA2-256 ECDSA-SHA2-256-FIDO \ ECDSA-SHA3-384 ECDSA-SHA2-384 \ ECDSA-SHA3-512 ECDSA-SHA2-512 \ EDDSA-ED25519 EDDSA-ED25519-FIDO EDDSA-ED448 \ RSA-PSS-SHA3-256 RSA-PSS-SHA2-256 \ RSA-PSS-SHA3-384 RSA-PSS-SHA2-384 \ RSA-PSS-SHA3-512 RSA-PSS-SHA2-512 \ RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA3-256 RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA2-256 \ RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA3-384 RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA2-384 \ RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA3-512 RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA2-512 \ RSA-SHA3-256 RSA-SHA2-256 \ RSA-SHA3-384 RSA-SHA2-384 \ RSA-SHA3-512 RSA-SHA2-512 cipher = AES-256-GCM AES-256-CCM CHACHA20-POLY1305 \ AES-256-CTR cipher@Kerberos = AES-256-CBC+ cipher@TLS = AES-256-GCM AES-256-CCM CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher@RPM = AES-256-CFB AES-256-GCM AES-256-OCB AES-256-EAX # CBC ciphers in SSH are considered vulnerable to plaintext recovery attacks # and disabled in client OpenSSH 7.6 (2017) and server OpenSSH 6.7 (2014). cipher@SSH = -*-CBC key_exchange = ECDHE DHE DHE-RSA PSK DHE-PSK ECDHE-PSK ECDHE-GSS DHE-GSS protocol@TLS = TLS1.3 TLS1.2 DTLS1.2 protocol@IKE = IKEv2 # Parameter sizes min_dh_size = 3072 min_dsa_size = 3072 # DSA is disabled min_rsa_size = 3072 # GnuTLS only for now sha1_in_certs = 0 arbitrary_dh_groups = 1 ssh_certs = 1 etm@ssh = ANY